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NUCLEAR GENOCIDE IN CANADA Part 9 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) "The (Cameco, Port Hope) site includes approximately 44 structures or activity areas. The structures which have been constructed since the 1960's should have been designed and constructed in compliance with one of the editions of the National Building Code. None of the structures were constructed in compliance with the edition of the National Building Code that was in effect at the time of the design and construction of the buildings." (Cyril Hare Report, Dec. 20, 2005, pg. 2) The Union of Industry and Regulator The CNSC (and formerly Atomic Energy Control Board AECB) has allowed Cameco (and formerly Eldorado) to operate in non-compliance of the National Fire and Building Codes since the codes were instituted in the 1960's. This 'symbiotic relationship' between regulator and industry has existed since the AECB was created in 1946 and it is still flourishing today. This relationship was pointed out in 1980 during British Columbia's commission on uranium mining. In the report, the British Columbia Medical Association (BCMA) stated: "Such a policy statement (from AECB), based on antiquated data and inadequate literature review, would be irresponsible coming from the nuclear industry, let alone the regulatory agency of that industry. However, as will become clear, it is difficult to ascertain where one ends and the other begins." The BCMA went on to show that the regulators' advisory committee on radiation levels was comprised almost entirely of former AECL employees. The only medical doctor on the committee had worked his whole life at AECL. The BCMA report continues: "Dr. Butler (AECB) agreed that his Committee had not asked any independent bodies, such as the Canadian Medical Association, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons, or the Royal Society, to place a member of its own choice on the Committee. The 'independence' of this Committee must be seriously questioned. This lack of 'independence' is characteristic of the Atomic Energy Control Board." (Health Dangers of Uranium Mining and Jurisdictional Questions, 1980) In its final report, the BCMA concluded: "The AECB is not fit to regulate." Non Governamental Organizations (NGO), grass-roots groups and individuals have always complained of the bond between industry and regulator. W.R. Adamson filed a petition with the Auditor General regarding Cluff Lake on June 25, 2004. The following is taken from his petition. "It has been known for some time by citizens and various citizen groups that CNSC is more interested in facilitating and protecting the uranium industry than guarding the environment and health of the workers and public interest. The size of the investment and supposed economic returns provide undue political pressure to override the inconvenience of delays by sound environmental assessments, and the difficulties of long-term problems such as the immense wastes along the shores of Lake Athabasca, which have not been cleaned up in 50 years, and which will require billions of dollars to do so." (W.R.Adamson, 2004, Petition to Auditor General) In his closing comments in a letter to the CNSC, Dr. Edwards stated: "CNSC staff seems to be acting almost as an apologist for the proponent (Bruce Power), running interference for them by blocking efforts to ensure a more thorough level of public accountability on environmental matters. CCNR wonders what real value there is in even having a regulatory agency if that is as far as it is willing to go in terms of transparency, accountability, and vigilance." (Dr. Gordon Edwards, April 25, 2005) "That said, there's legitimate concern over the extent to which Keen and senior staff are privately meeting with nuclear interests. This is all happening as the industry holds a 'full court press' to expand operations – while pushing for more lenient environmental assessments – in several provinces. When you understand that they're conducting these meetings effectively in secret, and you combine that with the increasing regulatory leniency that the (commission) is showing to the nuclear industry, I think two and two make four. This is an agency that has been seriously co-opted, and is in serious need of reform." (David Martin, Grenpeace) Report Criticizes CNSC To counter these accusations, the CNSC commissioned a report into the matter by the Institute on Governance. The report confirmed our concerns and was critical of the CNSC. The CNSC subsequently tried to dismiss the conclusions of the report they had ordered. The following excerpt from an article in the Globe and Mail sheds more light on the relationship between the nuclear industry and the CNSC: "Canada's nuclear-safety watchdog appears to be too cozy with the industry it's supposed to monitor, suggests an independent report. The study ordered by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), an independent federal government agency that regulates the use of nuclear energy and material, cites long-standing complaints that the regulator focuses far more on the companies it licenses than on concerned lobby groups or citizens." The commission "has in the past put more focus on communicating with licensees than with non-government organizations and the broader public," says the report by the Institute on Governance, a non-profit organization aimed at promoting effective governance. "And this may have contributed to the perception among NGOs that the (commission) has too close a relationship with industry. Recent efforts to more effectively engage NGOs are aimed at addressing this issue. Critics have gone further, saying the commission's closed-door sessions with nuclear interests should raise alarms that the regulator is being co-opted." (Globe and Mail, Oct. 9, 2007) Inability to Fight Radiological Fires Port Hope residents came 'face-to-face' with the industry/regulator union at the 2005 Mid-Term License Review Hearings. It was assumed that the Hearings would give Port Hope residents an opportunity to voice their concerns and have some of their questions answered concerning the two nuclear fuel cycle facilities located in the middle of town. Nothing could be farther from the truth. We were not allowed to ask questions, though the Commissioners could ask individuals questions on their presentation. In his presentation, Port Hope Councillor John Morand told the CNSC Commissioners that the Port Hope Fire Department could not fight radiological fires at Cameco and Zircatec. When Mr. Morand finished, a Commissioner asked Zircatec President Lloyd Jones if he knew about fire fighting limitations. Mr. Jones said he didn't know about it. Mr. Morand immediately produced a letter from Port Hope Fire Chief Frank Haylow which stated: "Based on the significant risk this licensed industry poses if a fire or other emergency were to occur, it is my professional opinion that our current volunteer staffing model would not be sufficient to deal with a large fire or hazardous materials emergency at this location." The letter had been sent to Zircatec, Cameco and the CNSC 3 months before the Hearings. Mr. Morand produced another letter from the CNSC to Zircatec and Cameco informing them of the fire fighting limitations. This exchange over the lack of fire protection was disturbing on many levels and it illustrates the inappropriate protection the CNSC is providing to Cameco, Zircatec and its staff at the expense of Port Hope residents. Consider the following: – A private citizen had to inform the CNSC Commissioners that there was no capability in Port Hope to fight radiological fires. – The CNSC Staff reports on Cameco and Zircatec made no mention of the fire fighting limitations. – The CNSC has known of the inability to fight radiological fires for 24 years but has done nothing to rectify the situation to protect Port Hope. – The Commissioners did not reprimand or admonish CNSC Staff for excluding the fire fighting limitations from their report or for failure to ensure the provision of adequate emergency services. – The President of a nuclear fuel cycle facility lied to the Commissioners about his knowledge of the limitations of the Port Hope Fire Department. The Commissioners did not reprimand Mr. Jones for lying to them. The CNSC hired Consultant Cyril Hare to determine the adequacy of fire protection at Cameco and Zircatec. The report stated: "At the present time, Zircatec must rely on the Port Hope Fire Department to control and extinguish fires in its property. The Port Hope Fire Department is not equipped, trained or staffed to deal with the worst case emergency that could occur at Zircatec Precision Industries. (Cyril Hare Report, 2005) The identical statement was written about Cameco. The CNSC failed to ensure that Port Hope residents were protected from accidents and fires at Cameco and Zircatec. The CNSC has always been aware of the problem but did nothing about it. It was community groups, not the nuclear regulator who exposed the shortcomings and forced the required changes. Incestuous Relationship The only thing we got from our participation in the 2005 Hearings was an understanding of the incestuous relationship between the CNSC, the nuclear industry and the CNSC Commissioners. The president of the CNSC is also the chair of the Commissioners. How can you have an independent oversight body when the same person is the head of both organizations? To my knowledge, there is no other regulator that operates in this manner. As one observer said: "They have the same fox leading the foxes as they have in charge of the henhouse." It was evident at the Hearings that CNSC president Linda Keene was using her commanding positions as head of the CNSC Staff and the Commissioners to protect the staff from being held accountable for their incompetence and corruption. This is a blatant conflict of interest. The Commissioners are supposed to be at arm's length from the CNSC yet Linda Keene controlled both organizations. The CNSC Commissioners are a civilian oversight body on the CNSC. Their function is similar to that of the Senate in Ottawa. I have no doubt that the Commissioners are competent and well respected in their fields, but their knowledge of the nuclear-related situations in a specific community pales in comparison with that of the people in the community who have spent years researching the conditions they live in. Community members are virtually excluded from most regulatory processes. We are allowed to make a ten minute intervention at some hearings, though we cannot ask questions and expect a response. Most of the time, we are restricted to submitting written comments. Does Uranium Burn or Explode? A public debate raged in Port Hope after the Hearings on the physical properties of uranium. Cameco and Zircatec were adamant that uranium would not burn or explode. Community groups produced information including a copy of Cameco's own MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet) specifications, that stated that uranium did burn. We wrote the CNSC and asked them to settle the debate. They never responded to our requests. During a February 2006 Port Hope Council meeting, Port Hope Fire Chief Frank Haylow gave council an update on Cameco's efforts towards improving fire protection. After his presentation, the first question directed at him from the audience was whether the CNSC had informed him if uranium could explode. Mr. Haylow responded: "The CNSC couldn't tell me if uranium could explode or not." (Fire Chief Haylow to Port Hope Council, February 2006) We were stunned. The CNSC is the nuclear regulatory body of the country that supplies the most uranium in the world and it couldn't tell our Fire Chief whether uranium could burn or not. How can we protect our communities from fires and accidents if the CNSC cannot tell us the dangers we face from the materials they are supposed to be regulating? We realized that we were on our own. Community Groups Fight Back In 2004,Cameco applied to the CNSC to possess and process enriched uranium in Port Hope. The CNSC allowed Cameco to analyze the project with a Screening Level Environmental Assessment; the lowest level of assessment possible. As such, there were no funds available to have independent experts analyze the proposal on behalf of the community. The task was left to community groups. As we went through the 900 page Environmental Assessment (EA), it was very obvious that a great deal of information was missing and several studies that were referenced, simply did not exist. We compiled a list of 623 questions and submitted them to Cameco and the CNSC. Heather Jarrett from the CNSC was blunt in her response: "The CNSC is not mandated to answer your questions." And they never did answer any of more than a hundred questions directed at them. Cameco answered about half the questions and expanded the EA to 1350 pages. We submitted a further 200 questions and requested more information. Cameco responded with a 2200 page version of the EA. By this time, Port Hope Council began to take our concerns seriously and hired consultants Jacques Whitford to Peer Review the EA. Jacques Whitford raised the same concerns we did and submitted 200 questions to Cameco. Cameco refused to answer the 65 most important questions which triggered a scathing report by Jacques Whitford on Cameco's EA. The report criticized the actions and inactions of the CNSC as much as those of Cameco. The following are some of their findings: "CNSC staff has not followed the directives of the CNSC Commission with regard to health issues, has not followed the CNSC's Guidelines or the requirements of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act." "Cameco states, and the CNSC appears to accept, that it was not necessary to determine the significance of environmental effects, when clearly the Act requires a determination of significance for all adverse environmental effects of the project." "Cameco and the CNSC are not preparing or providing information that the (CNSC) Guidelines require. The Municipality of Port Hope needs more information with respect to potential threats, response capabilities and security requirements." "The Environmental Assessment does not contain required information with respect to the potential health effects or cumulative health effects of uranium as a chemically toxic substance." The Jacques Whitford Report was released to the public on the morning of September 22, 2005, the deadline for submissions. Cameco withdrew their application that afternoon. By that time, the CNSC was under attack as much as Cameco. It was better for Cameco and the CNSC to terminate all discussions than it was to have their conduct scrutinized any further during the scheduled hearings. This application would have proceeded with a 'rubber stamp' from the CNSC if it weren't for the effort and dedication of community groups who exposed the false and missing information. There was never an instance during this process where the CNSC acted in the best interests of Port Hope residents. Their only concern was to protect Cameco and its application from thorough scrutiny. Zircatec Two months after withdrawing their application to process enriched uranium, Cameco purchased Zircatec (builds fuel rods) in Port Hope. In 2006, Zircatec (Cameco owned) applied to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to possess and process enriched uranium in Port Hope in their facility within 50 feet of a group home. Zircatec's application was also assessed through a screening level EA. However, to avoid the scrutiny the first application was subjected to by community groups, the CNSC changed the rules concerning community participation in the process. According to Families Against Radiation Exposure (FARE): "Public opposition at the environmental assessment stage forced Cameco to cancel plans for SEU production at its Port Hope conversion facility last year. Since then, however, the rules have changed. The CNSC recently revised its rules for public participation at environmental assessment hearings before the Commission. From now on, "decisions on environmental assessment guidelines are now made by the Commission via an abridged process in closed sessions." Participation will be limited to licensees and CNSC staff. According to the CNSC website, "public involvement in a screening is at the discretion of the responsible authority and depends on factors such as the nature of the project, its environmental setting and public concerns. FARE regards this latest move to be a cynical 'back door' attempt to introduce large-scale production of SEU into our community, without any meaningful input by the people who live here. Although CNSC president Linda Keen said there still will be public participation, the new rules appear to limit it to "consultations led by CNSC staff or the proponent." "The CNSC has shown once again that it's priority is to serve the interests of the nuclear industry at the expense of the people who must live with the consequences. The CNSC process makes a mockery of environmental laws that were intended to give people real influence in decisions affecting their lives. The CNSC turns this on its head by preventing informed, effective public participation. It is time for the federal government to protect us by abolishing this Commission and creating an alternative for Canada that truly works in the public interest." (Families Against Radiation Exposure, 2006) How can the community feel any confidence in the safety of these projects when there is no transparency, no due process and no opportunity for the public and experts to be involved? The CNSC is preventing all meaningful community participation in the process. The more the community educates itself about what is going on, the more the CNSC removes us from involvement in the assessments. Health Studies The CNSC's predecessor, the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), promised they would conduct comprehensive health studies in Port Hope starting in 1978. We are still waiting. In October 2004, the CNSC's Barclay Howden told Port Hope Council that the CNSC would no longer order health studies. It was now Health Canada's responsibility to do so. We met with Federal Health Minister Carolyn Bennett the following month in Ottawa. She listened attentively and agreed there appeared to be problems in Port Hope. But as with all her predecessors since 1978, she did not order health studies. In the summer of 2006 at a Health Forum in Port Hope, Health Canada announced that they were no longer responsible for ordering health studies in Port Hope. It fell under the jurisdiction of the CNSC once again. When contacted, the CNSC responded that they would order no further health study as health studies were the responsibility of the province and they would respect the province's jurisdiction. The CNSC is using the same tactic in Port Hope as the Canadian Government used with the people of Deline and the Veterans who were exposed to atomic bomb tests. They delay the testing as long as they can so that the people who were affected can die off before the illnesses and deaths are counted. Linda Keen Firing It was revealed during the November 2007 maintenance shutdown of the NRU reactor that generates the medical isotopes that AECL had not installed safety equipment on the reactor as mandated by their 2005 license renewal. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) ordered the reactor shut down until the safety equipment was installed. The Federal Government subsequently set a dangerous precedent by overruling the CNSC and ordered the reactor restarted without the safety equipment in place. The Canadian Government fired the head of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission because she would not compromise safety for profit in this instance. This is a dangerous precedent. Recent Leaks at NRU Reactor The CNSC and AECL have come under fire recently for not publicly announcing the three most recent leaks at Chalk River's NRU reactor; Dec. 5 and 9, 2008, and February 22, 2008. John Bennett, the communications director for the Green Party, said the CNSC should have ordered the reactor shut down as soon as problems (leaks) were discovered. "Of course, is the nuclear safety commission going to shut down that reactor for safety after what happened a year ago?" asked Mr. Bennett. "The people responsible for safety are afraid to shut it down because the last time they held up production, their president got fired." (Gloria Galloway, Globe and Mail, January 29, 2009) "The NRU (built in 1957) is old and prone to operational problems. It is noteworthy, that the cause of the December 5th leak has never been determined and staff have acknowledged that it is likely to happen again. As recently as February 23, 2009, the AECL reported yet another potential leak. This does not inspire confidence. We need more information and we need independent, peer-reviewed research that helps answer some of the questions posed. If AECL stands behind their statements about "no risks to human health or the health of the Ottawa River, then why not make all information available to the public, to allow for appropriate consultation and science-based decision making?" (Meredith Brown, Riverkeeper and Executive Director) Environmental Assessments (EA) Canada's Auditor General According to the Auditor General's 1998 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment: "6.7 - Environmental assessment is the examination of planned projects, programs, policies or activities to ensure that potential impacts on the environment receive careful consideration before decisions are taken in connection with them. It is a critically important planning tool, given the potential for serious and irreversible damage to the environment that can result from human activity. Failure to consider adverse environmental impacts before carrying out an undertaking can lead to significant environmental degradation, damage to human health, and increased economic costs. The high clean-up costs and environmental damage at the Sydney Tar Ponds in Cape Breton illustrate some of the consequences of lack of environmental foresight." "6.67 - A majority of the 187 files we examined had screening reports that did not meet the minimum criteria set out in the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency's (CEAA) guide. In particular, the description of the project or of the environment was often incomplete. This would make it very difficult for a member of the public to determine whether the environmental assessment had in fact considered all of the potentially significant environmental effects of the project." Pickering and the Federal EA Process The following is from the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment and Natural resources investigating the environmental assessment for the restart of the Pickering reactors. "The Committee heard strong, often conflicting opinions about the adequacy of the recently completed federal environmental assessment of the restart of Pickering A. While OPG officials held that the review exceeded the legal requirements for a review of a restart, citizens groups, municipal councils and others held that it was seriously deficient. Chief among the criticisms were that: – The assessment excluded any consideration of a severe accident at Pickering A or the consequences of such an accident beyond the plant site, – That alternative ways to meet electricity demands were not considered – An independent, full-panel review was not ordered and – The CNSC poorly met its obligations under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. "Until recently, no nuclear power generating station has been the subject of a federal environmental assessment. Some aspects of the industry have been assessed and projects at stations have been reviewed. However, no station as a whole has been subjected to the review process. All currently held licences were initially granted prior to1995, the year that CEAA came into force. Although the federal Cabinet had established the Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) Guidelines in 1984, before many of Canada's nuclear power reactors first operated, the Cabinet order was not applied to them. It was not considered mandatory until it was later challenged in court. Review panels under the EARP Guidelines were completed on the concept of deep geological disposal of nuclear waste, on uranium mining developments in Northern Saskatchewan and on the uranium mine tailings areas of Elliot Lake." (Canada's Nuclear Reactors: How much Safety is Enough?, June 2001) Bruce Power Refurbishment Many people complain about the lack of opportunities for the public to comment during the regulatory process involving these projects. The CNSC has continued to curtail these oppotunities for Canadians. Dr. Edwards speaks to this in his submission to the CNSC: "Many of the comments related to the meager opportunities for citizens and non-governmental organizations to undertake a meaningful review of this gargantuan project, due to the CNSC Staff's intention to deny any opportunity for an independent panel hearing, consequently the absence of intervenor funding, combined with the CNSC Staff's determination to roll several large projects (the refurbishment of units 1 and 2, the eventual retubing of units 3 and 4, and the switch from natural uranium fuel to slightly enriched fuel) into one low-level environmental screening review." (Dr. Gordon Edwards, April 25, 2005) Cluff Lake Mine EA W.R. Adamson filed a petition with the Auditor General on June 25, 2004 on the Cluff Lake EA which stated: "Moreover, the mining industry has brought undue pressure on the CEAA to speed up environmental assessments, or to by-pass them, by using the principle that "what seems to be a similar situation does not need a separate assessment." This is a dangerous principle for uranium mining where each mine is unique in situation, geology, environmental and geographic characteristics. If the current Cogema proposal serves as a prototype for future decommissioning, then we can expect serious problems for Canada, and particularly Saskatchewan, in future times. "The Comprehensive Study Report claimed that Cogema had done extensive public consultation. Yet, the public could not have given a 'considered response' because even when CNSC issued its Report it did not include the primary data and test results for making future projections. Later the CNSC staff stated that anyone could have accessed the volumes of data, such as 2000A, 2000B, 2000C, 2000D - but they did not tell the public they were available until the formal document came out. After that there were only a limited number of days in which citizens could make interventions. The public consultation was a farce!" (W.R. Adamson, Petition to the Auditor General regarding Cluff Lake on June 25, 2004) Radioactive Waste The largest radioactive waste cleanup in Canadian history is currently in the planning stages in Port Hope Ontario. The project is being managed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), the Federal organization that caused the radioactive waste problem in the first place. The project is being assessed through a Screening Level environmental assessment. This is the lowest level environmental assessment possible. In essence, the proponent (AECL) is assessing itself. Consultation Periods Too Short Grass roots community groups and interested individuals have complained they are not being given enough time to assess complex nuclear projects. The inadequacies of the length of consultation periods were brought to the attention of the CNSC at their September 13, 2007 Public Meeting by both AECL and Greenpeace. The subject under consideration was the siting for new nuclear reactors. Dave Torgerson from AECL: "We have a little bit of concern with the proposed 60 day consultation period since it is not clear to us that that would provide sufficient time for us to comment more fulsomely on this." (pg. 154, CNSC Transcript) Shawn Patrick Stensil from Greenpeace stated: "We agree with the AECL in terms of problems of having a 60-day consultation period. Other members of the NGO community have long felt that." (pg. 156, CNSC Transcript) These gentlemen were saying 60 days was not enough time for their large well-funded organizations to comment on the creation of a regulatory document. Yet the CNSC expects unfunded community groups to comment on something as complex as the installation of an enriched uranium process in 30 days without allowing us to see the documents their decision is based on. Where is prudence and fairness in this situation? Summary The CNSC is trying to legislate community involvement right out of the regulatory process for nuclear projects. Citizens have become too well-informed for the comfort of the regulators and the industry. The CNSC has maintained its stance the past few years of reviewing projects with the lowest level of assessment possible. The CNSC's incestuous relationship with the nuclear industry has caused needless harm to people's health and our environment. They have consistently ruled in favour of the nuclear industry to the detriment of Canadians. The massive contamination of Deline, Port Hope, Serpent River, Pinawa, Chalk River and other sites bears witness to the CNSC's incompetence and corruption with respect to protecting Canadians. Canadians must have a forum to voice their concerns regarding the nuclear industry. The nuclear regulators have abandoned their mandated responsibilities in favour of climbing into bed with the nuclear industry. The incestuous relationship between the industry and the regulator is now complete. There is no ethical voice working on our behalf. End of Part 9 |